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ABSTRACT:  
The attacks of September 11 in 2001 gave a great shock to the world. After the incident, airport security is 
much higher and stricter than ever before. Even though you are not American citizens, you may remember 
the terrorism of the 9.11. On the other hand, do you know the terrorism by AUM Shinrikyo, on the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Subway in 1995? In our society, this was the first terrorism, which was used a chemical 
weapon, sarin gas, to the general public. When AUM Shinrikyo members attacked subways, Japanese People 
were in panic. However, this attack was occurred over 15 years ago, so even Japanese people become 
forgetting it. This is because the Japanese people have never experienced such terrible terrorism since 1995. 
On the other hand, one of current global issues is how to handle global terrorism. Today, terrorists try to 
attack our society by any means. As a last resort, they are able to use CBRN (chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear) weapons of mass destruction if they would like to. "If our society is attacked by these 
weapons…" We must consider of the worst thing and be ready for any situation against terrorism. 
This paper discusses how the society prepares for CBRN terrorism. As an example of terrorist attacks by 
CBRN weapons, “1995 Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack” is explained. The attack aimed to Tokyo Metropolitan 
Subway system, so it has much information for transportation security management and is instructive for 
security and safety. In this paper, I also focus on detection equipments in airport security system. Current hot 
topic on airport security is how to detect explosives. In near future, however, we will need to discuss on 
CBRN terrorism against airports. This paper may be effective for the next era of our social security 
management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2001, the attacks of September 11 occurred in 
the US. The target of the terrorism was the US 
homeland, US citizens and their pride as Americans. 
Using as powerful bombs, four airplanes were 
hijacked by suicide bombers. Two planes clashed 
against the tower of the World Trade Center 
Complex, and the other two crashed on ground. Over 
3,000 people killed. The attack gave great shock to 
American people.  
After the 9.11, airport security system has 
dramatically changed in the world. Security alert 
level at airports was the highest immediately, in 
Japan too. The airport authority started to develop 
new security systems for taking preventive measures 
against terrorism and to introduce new equipments to 
find explosives and the IEDs (improvised explosive 
devices = handmade bombs).  
  In airport security, finding explosives is currently 
important. Security screeners especially check 
electrical appliances, computers, shoes, outerwear 
and liquid at the airport checkpoint because these 
items may become one device of explosives. 
Whenever terrorism occurs, security alert level is 
raised. Current security level is much higher than 
before, and in short, our society is much more 
protected before by strict security management. Now, 
one question comes; is the management enough for 
combating terrorism? Today, terrorists’ plans and 
methods are beyond our imagination. For terrorists, 
nothing is taboo. They can use any measures for 
achieving their own purpose. 
In fact, the measure corresponding to invisible 
threats, including CBRN (chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear) terrorism, is not satisfactory 
even in airport management with high level security 
system. Since terrorists are able to choose the use of 
CBRN weapons of mass destruction, the authority 
considers of the threats of CBRN terrorism against 
our society. 
This paper focuses on the preparations of CBRN 
terrorism. Firstly, it states the hot-button of current 
airport security system and shows the trend of 
terrorism. Then, as the example of the threat of 
CBRN terrorism, “1995 Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack” is 
explained. After discussing what the relevant 
agencies need to prepare for terrorism toward 
airports, this paper finally offers for correspond to 
CBRN terrorism in time to come. 
 
2. Global Challenges 
 
After the attacks of September 11, the business 
market related to airport security became active, and 
airport security equipments made rapid progress. 
Major manufacturers in Western countries began to 
make advanced security equipments with new 
technologies. The airport authority started the trial 
for the performance of new equipments and installed 
them. At that time, for airport security, two important 
equipments were developed; Explosives Trace 
Detection (ETD) and integrated Explosives 
Detection Systems (EDS). ETD is the extremely 
sensitive scanning device. At the checkpoints, 
security screeners swab a piece of luggage 
(Figure 2.1) or several puffs of air are released 
on the passenger (Figure 2.2), and then ETD can 
analyze for trace explosive particles on luggage 
and passengers. When it detects the trace of 
gunpowder, the alarm will come. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure2.1: ETD for Luggage (TSA Website) 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: ETD for Passengers (TSA Website) 
EDS is for large baggage inspection (Figure 2.3). 
The system has 3DX computed tomography (CT) 
technology and X-ray to detect explosives such 
as detonators and C4, known as a plastic bomb. 
 
Figure 2.3: EDS (TSA Website) 
 
These equipments introduced international airports 
in the Western countries, and Japan has the 
equipments of figure 2.1 & 2.3. 
Recently, liquid screening is also concerned and 
discussed in airport security management.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Aviation Security Rules for Liquid 
  (Japan Civil Aviation Bureau Website & Swiss 
International Air Lines Website) 
 
In 2006, terrorists, who had a plot for the 
terrorism against airplanes by liquid explosive 
bombs, are arrested in England. Airport alert level 
was raised immediately like the situation of 9.11. As 
countermeasures against terrorism by liquid 
explosive bombs, the airport authority controls liquid 
products such as aerosol and gels on board with 
passengers. International flight passengers are 
requested to give up for bringing any liquid products 
with the exception of bottles 3 ounces or smaller (or 
100 ml) in 1 quart sized transparent zip top bag 
(Figure 2.4). 
Even under strict security regulations, another 
terrorist attack occurs in succession. On December 
25 of 2009, a suspected terrorist brought explosives 
on board. It is said that the terrorist is related to 
Al-Qaeda, and the US people must remember the 
threat of the 9.11 attacks. After the Christmas 
incident, new security equipments began to 
introduce at airports in the Western countries. In the 
US, the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) has piloted advanced security equipment at 
airports since 2007. The advanced imaging 
technologies, which are millimeter wave 
technology (Figure 2.5: left) and backscatter 
technology (Figure 2.5: right), “can detect a wide 
range of threats to transportation security (TSA  
Website).”  
Figure 2.5: Millimeter Wave & Backscatter 
(TSA Website) 
 
Security screeners can detect metallic and 
non-metallic threats such as weapons, 
explosives and other articles without physical 
contact. By using these new equipments, 
however, the image of a body line is clearly 
shown on the screen. Although privacy issues 
have been discussed for a long time (Figure 2.6 
& 2.7, Pietra & Callahan, 2009), by new 
technologies, our flight safety is more protected. 
Under the current social conditions, security 
may be more important than privacy. 
 
  
Figure2.6: Millimeter 
Wave Image        
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Backscatter 
Image 
 
 
 
 
Thus, in airports, finding explosives is 
currently the most serious concern of 
counterterrorism. In addition to the thinking of 
explosives, the airport authority must consider 
of the possibility that terrorists may use 
weapons of mass destruction. For terrorists, 
there is no taboo in their own world. Before they 
use these weapons, the authority needs to 
understand how to control them and how to 
prepare for the worst thing. 
 
3. New Era—Weapons of Mass Destruction 
3.1 Threat of Terrorism 
 
Today, the threat of terrorism remains still high 
alert level although a nation has good international 
cooperation and an encircling net with other nations. 
Terrorists attack the general public and important 
facilities. The targeted people are mostly innocent 
and faithful citizens who have no any relation to 
terrorist group. The attacked important facilities are 
generally military installations, an official residence 
of the Prime Minister, nuclear power plants, hotels, 
stations and airports. Terrorists understand that it is 
easy to attack defenseless people and that the impact 
of terrorism against important facilities is huge 
(Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Recent Terrorism against 
the General Public 
Date Country Target #of 
Deaths 
Jul. 2006 India Train 186 
Jul. 2005 UK Train 52 
Mar. 2004 Spain Train 191 
Oct. 2002 Indonesia Downtow
n 
202 
Sep. 2001 USA Airplanes 2973 
 
Transportation security management, especially of 
airports, has been greatly influenced by global 
terrorism. Current airport security system is only for 
the terrorism by explosives, not by CBRN weapons. 
Although all airports are forced to take measures 
against global terrorism, the security system lacks 
anti-CBRN terrorism strategy.  
  Japan has the worst model of unprecedented 
terrorism. Japanese people experienced the terrorism 
by using a chemical weapon. The attack was done by 
a cult religious group, AUM Shinrikyo, and their 
tactics made the great impact over the world. Owing 
to the terrible attack by AUM members, not only 
Japanese society but also other nations understood 
how prevention system against terrorism is 
important. 
 
3.2 Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack 
 
In the morning of 20 March 1995, Tokyo 
Metropolitan subways filled to capacity. The 
crowded trains were attacked by AUM Shinrikyo. 
The cult members released sarin gas inside trains, 
which were on Marunouchi, Chiyoda and Hibiya 
subway lines. As soon as possible, in the case of 
terrorism by chemical warfare agents, “detection and 
identification are important” (Seto, 2006). In Japan, 
however, this was the first and unique experience for 
first responders, the police and firefighters, so 
on-site detection was unsuccessful. Because they 
could not detect which gas released immediately, 
they mistook the approach toward the gas and the 
treatment for injured people (Inoue, 2003). At a later 
time, on-site sample liquid was transferred to the 
FSL (the Forensic Science Laboratory of Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police Department). When the gas was 
detected as sarin at the FSL, it had already spent two 
hours since the gas released (Seto, 2006).  
Under the difficult situation on the site, police 
officers, firefighters, uniformed members of the 
Self-Defense Forces and medical team staff made all 
possible efforts to rescue the people. During two 
hours, however, because of the lack of information 
about the incident, on-site people were not able to 
know that the gas was sarin. They did not know how 
dreadful gas was released there. 
As a result of the AUM attack, 12 people died and 
over 5000 people injured. For our global society, this 
was the first terrorism model, which terrorists used 
chemical warfare agents toward the general public. 
 
3.3 Learning from the Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack 
 
If AUM Shinrikyo members used explosive bombs, 
the site management was not difficult. Since 
Japanese people had experienced bomb attacks 
before, first responders could control of on-site 
conditions better. Unfortunately, terrorism by sarin 
gas was the first experience for our society. They 
needed time to conclude what kind of agent was 
released, so they could not prevent secondary 
infection soon. On that occasion, people on the scene 
understood that the establishment of rapid detection 
system was important against chemical terrorist 
attacks. 
Against the terrorism by chemical weapons, the 
countermeasures are classified three management 
stages (Seto, 2006); crisis management, consequence 
management and incident management (Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2: Three Management Stages against 
Terrorism by Chemical Warfare Agents 
Crisis 
Management 
Before Terrorist Attack 
a) profiling 
b) monitoring 
c) border control 
d) security checks 
e) emergency training 
Consequence 
Management 
Aftermath Terrorist Attack 
a) on-site detection 
b) life saving 
c) investigation 
d) prevention for secondary infection 
Incident 
Management 
After Terrorist Attack 
a) laboratory analysis 
b) precise report 
c) feedback 
 
  Even though each management stage operates 
completely, there are no perfect countermeasures 
against terrorism. Because terrorists do not have 
taboo today, they work out new scheme in various 
ways and at various places. When AUM members 
attacked Tokyo subways by sarin gas, Japanese 
people could not understand soon what happened. At 
that time, in addition, the three management stages 
(see Table 3.2) did not work among related 
organizations and agencies. If each stage does not 
operate in case of massive terrorism, the damage 
expands rapidly and immediately. The AUM attack is 
the good illustration to explain the importance to 
operate each stage. 
 
1) Crisis Management 
  Before the Tokyo sarin gas attack, the National 
Police Agency (NPA) has already kept their eyes on 
AUM Shinrikyo. The NPA monitored AUM members 
and checked their activities. However, AUM 
Shinrikyo evaded the meshes of the law and was 
active. Unlike the aviation security system in airports, 
rail transportation does not have severe security 
checks at stations. In short, every people can enter a 
station and take a train easily. On the first 
management stage, monitoring for suspicious 
persons and security checks at public places are not 
enough, and the first stage was simply broken 
through by AUM members. 
 
2) Consequence Management 
Aftermath the AUM attack, people were thrown 
into confusion. According to the condition of injured 
people, it was clear that the incident happened 
because some chemical warfare agents were released. 
The first responders, the police officers and 
firefighters, tried to detect immediately what was 
released. To grasp the serious situation there, the 
on-site detection was required the exactness and the 
quickness. Since they have never experienced sarin 
gas attack, however, they went wrong. Until two 
hours later, the FSL detected the ingredient of sarin 
gas, people did not know about the released gas. 
Therefore, personal protection and medical treatment 
on the second management stage took effort through 
trial and error. 
 
3) Incident Management 
After the AUM attack, the agents were brought to 
the FSL for chemical analysis. Then, people knew 
that the released gas was sarin. The police 
investigated the incident and concluded that the 
attack was done by the AUM. On the final stage, the 
result of detailed analysis and investigation was 
reported. The report provided many data on sarin, 
and it was useful data for terrorism by chemical 
warfare agents in future. Because Western countries 
understood that one of the most countermeasures 
against terrorism is the feedback to stop security 
holes and weakness, the authorities of Western 
countries came to Japan and gathered information 
and data on sarin more eagerly than the ones in 
Japan (Inoue, 2003).  
 
Thus, each nation has continued to effort for 
combating terrorism, but terrorists take advantage of 
the social vulnerability and weak points in a nation. 
When terrorists attack our society by chemical 
weapons like sarin gas, fast on-site detection is the 
most necessary for life saving and initial 
investigation. We learn and know it owing to the 
AUM attack. 
Today, combating terrorism is one of the global 
urgent issues. In Western countries, the development 
of on-site chemical detection equipments with high 
technology is progressing. In the US, the 
counterterrorism fund has increased since 1996 
because of the terrorist bombings of the federal 
building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and in addition, 
the federal government has created “programs to 
train and equip local first responders to prepare for 
possible CBRN terrorist attacks” (Gebicke, 1999). In 
Japan, the National Research Institute of Police 
Science, universities and private companies research 
and challenge to develop new equipments together 
for rapid detection of chemical and biological agents. 
Moreover, after sarin gas attack, the 
countermeasures against terrorism and special 
incidents caused by radioactive materials, 
biological agents, hazardous articles and toxic 
substances are strengthened. For CBRN 
terrorism, the introduction of CBRN detection 
vehicles and portable equipments (Figure 3.1), such 
as portable gas chromatograph mass 
spectrometers (GC-MS) and infrared 
spectrometers (FT-IR), is advanced in 
Self-Defense Forces, the Tokyo Fire Department and 
some Police Departments. 
 
Figure 3.1 Portable Equipments against CBRN   
Terrorism (TFD Website) 
 
 
3.4 Security Management in Airports 
3.4.1 The US System 
 
For airport security management, the annex 17 of 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) is 
significant. In the annex, the provisions for 
safeguarding international civil aviation against acts 
of unlawful interference are written, to the 
Convention on international civil aviation by ICAO. 
According to the annex 17, the provisions of the 
Standards and Recommended Practices in the annex 
“are to be applied by contracting states” (ICAO 
Annex 17, 2006). ICAO contracting states are now 
190 in the world. They shall ensure that the 
provisions are applied to their own domestic and 
international operations because the standards are the 
minimum requirements for keeping the same level of 
aviation security among the states. Following the 
annex is the duty of ICAO contracting states. 
On the other hand, each nation has different 
airport management style. For developing countries 
like Indonesia and Brazil, it is difficult to conform in 
accordance with the ICAO Standards because of the 
lack of budget for security management. The US 
certainly recognizes the different balance of security 
system from other nations. Therefore, airport 
security management at the US airports is strict 
toward passengers who enter the US from other 
nations. In addition, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), which is the Federal Agency 
of the US, requests to obey the federal security 
regulations to others, so even passengers who depart 
from Narita international airport, Japan, they are 
screened by the TSA procedures at Narita. For 
profiling passengers, the TSA also uses federal 
information data. By the data, the TSA screens all 
passengers, who would like to enter the US, are 
absolutely checked at each nation before departing, 
even outside the US. The TSA does not believe the 
security management of other nations because an 
international airport is a melting-pot that passengers 
come from all parts of the world. 
If terrorists release sarin gas inside airports, can 
the airport authority correspond to the unexperienced 
severe situation under current airport security 
management? Even in the US airports, unfortunately 
the relevant agencies may not be able to handle the 
worst situation skillfully. For a long time, the 
agencies have focused on explosives detection. They 
have been interested how to detect explosives more 
quickly and exactly without false alarm. They have 
made every effort how they can find explosives and 
improvised explosive devices, so the technologies 
for explosives detection (see Figure 2.1~2.7) 
were developed and introduced at airport 
security checkpoints in Western countries. Even 
the airport authority officers in the US, they do not 
have paid attention to CBRN a lot. Now, however, 
the people must prepare for any terrorism not only 
visible explosives but also invisible threat like 
chemical and biological weapons. 
Airplanes bring passengers including a suspicious 
person. Everybody can come to an airport from all 
over the world. What should the authority take 
countermeasures against invisible terrorism? Before 
entering, passengers' profiling system is effective. 
Who? How old? Where come from? Why comes? 
How to buy the ticket? How appearance? By using 
profiling manual, the relevant agencies screen a 
person and his/her background, and then they should 
share the information each other. If the person enters 
in an airport, monitoring by CCTV cameras or 
airport security officers is effective. If finally 
something (invisible CBRN terrorism, etc.) occurs, 
rapid detection is important. The preparation of the 
detection system against CBRN terrorism lacks in 
current airport security management. 
 
3.4.2 Japanese System 
 
Narita international airport is the biggest airport in 
Japan. There are many shops and relaxation spaces. 
Like the US international airports, however, the 
airport does not have practical management system 
against CBRN terrorism. The relevant airport 
agencies believe that the special task forces of 
Self-Defense Force or the Police correspond to such 
terrorist attacks skillfully when the attacks actually 
occur in airports.  
For counterterrorism, the establishment of crisis 
management working group is important. In Narita 
international airport, however, the establishment of 
the working group is difficult because many 
agencies, including government authorities and 
private companies, are involved in airport security 
management. Table 3.3 shows that many agencies 
and organizations exist in Natrita international 
airport.  
 
 
  Table 3.3 Duties of Airport Security Management 
Agencies in Narita 
Organization Routine Work Anti-Terrorism 
Ministry of 
Land, 
Infrastructure & 
Transport 
・Civil Aviation 
& Navigation 
・Regulation 
・Responsible Authority 
Ministry of 
Finance 
・Custom ------- 
Ministry of 
Health, Labour 
and Welfare 
・Quarantine ・Anti-Biological 
Measures  
Ministry of 
Justice 
・Immigration ・Border Control 
Chiba 
Prefectural 
Police 
・Policing ・First Responders 
・Lab. Analysis 
Local Fire 
Department 
・Fire Drill  
・Rescue 
・First Responders 
・On-site Analysis 
Airport Clinic ・Consultation ・Critical Care 
Narita 
International 
Airport 
Corporation 
・Supervising 
・Administration 
・Airport Monitoring 
Airlines ・Aircraft Safety ・Passenger Monitoring 
 
Every agency has own regulations and 
confidential information, so they have complicated 
relations to other agencies. Unfortunately, it may be 
hard to integrate all agencies for combating terrorism. 
Under the current Narita situation, each agency 
should prepare for protecting Narita airport by own 
way. The preparation is their duty. In that case, it is 
necessary to tell other agencies how own agency 
respond to CBRN terrorism. At least, communication 
system with other relevant agencies has to improve. 
Before terrorism occurs at airport, it is important that 
each agency recognizes which agency has what 
responsibility. 
In addition to the establishment of the inside 
security management working group, the 
establishment of practical relationship with special 
task units of Self-Defense Forces, the National 
Research Institute of Police Science and the National 
Police Agency is also necessary. Although airport 
agencies do not prepare the equipments against 
CBRN weapons, the outsiders have fully equipped 
special task units for combating terrorism. When a 
serious incident, which occurs in airports, is 
unmanageable, incorrigible and out of control, good 
relationship with outsiders is important. 
 
4. Effective Security Management 
 
In fact, few airports have the defense system 
against CBRN terrorism today. The lack of 
defense system is the vulnerability of airport 
security management. The untouched weak 
points are not conquered immediately because 
the security cost must be huge, but the airport 
authority always has to show defensive 
attitudes toward terrorists. For our society as 
same as airports, cautiously, to keep the high 
level of security management is the most 
effective to deter terrorism.    
There are two points for keeping the effective 
security management; 1) good relations and 
communication with relevant agencies, and 2) 
the development and introduction of new 
detection equipments. 
4.1 Importance of Good Relationship 
 
 In Japan, each agency began to establish close ties 
with others after the Tokyo sarin gas attack although 
the strength of relations are not enough to fill in 
vulnerable cracks. The relevant agencies have 
seriously discussed on the prevention measures 
against terrorism, contingency plans, life saving 
methods and emergency phone trees in the CBRN 
liaison conference. The agencies get together at the 
conference and consult each other. In discussion, 
they should talk about terrorism not only by 
explosive bombs but also by CBRN weapons. No 
matter what happens, the relevant agencies have to 
manage the social security and safety. When a 
serious incident occurs, it can operate the best way if 
every agency receives same information and if each 
agency understands each role. 
 
4.2 Necessity of Advanced Detection Equipment 
 
  In addition to close relations laterally, research, 
development and introduction (RDI) of detection 
equipments with advanced technologies must 
progress more in the world. In Japan, however, RDI 
is outdistanced in comparison to the Western 
countries because of five reasons; the difference 
from the Western countries in 1) national budget for 
anti-terrorism, 2) CBRN business market, 3) the 
relations between private companies and the state 
organs, 4) difficulty for obtaining reagents, and 5) 
certification system for new equipments. The US and 
Europe understand that a nation has the 
responsibility of homeland security, so they spend a 
large amount of money for counterterrorism. The 
governments of these nations are closely connected 
with private companies, which have new 
technologies, and challenge to develop new 
detection equipments together. The research 
institutes on the force and the police are also 
involved in the experimental process, so it is easy to 
obtain chemical and biological reagents for 
laboratory work. When new equipments are 
completed, the investigation is done by the state 
organ, which is the charge of equipment 
performance, thoroughly. After passing the 
investigation, the companies can sell the new 
equipments, which have national certifications, to 
the world. On the other hand, in Japan, there are no 
well-established relations between private companies 
and state organs unlike the Western countries 
because each organization would not like to take the 
responsibility for risk and crisis management. 
Actually, in many countries, crisis management 
against terrorism is the national mission. Among 
state organs in Japan, however, the sense of crisis is 
low. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
  In current global society, practical preparation 
against terrorism is absolutely urgent. By a ship, an 
airplane, a train and a car, people can move easier 
than before. They are able to go everywhere they 
would like to. Under the convenient transportation 
system, it is impossible to find perfectly (100%) 
even if a terrorist is in the movement. When we 
cannot find the one, our lives are put in danger 
immediately by the only one suspected person.  
  In Japan, disaster management system has already 
established because of many natural disasters. By 
law, the system is laid down in detail. In addition, 
the authorities of Japan have a rescue robot and 
equipment for disaster minimization. On the other 
hand, the readiness to fight future and new terrorism 
is not enough in comparison with the preparation for 
natural disasters. Even though Japan has crisis 
management system, it is not enough. Even though 
Japan introduces advanced detection equipment, it is 
not enough. The system and the equipment must 
unite to be functioned the defense system against 
CBRN terrorism. 
Only Japanese people experienced the terrorism 
by chemical weapons. The country, Japan, has to 
lead the world on the basis of the unique experience. 
As one of developed and as one of industrially 
advanced nations, Japan has to have more 
responsible role for anti-terrorism measures. Then, 
people, who live in peace and safety anytime, 
understand what detection system is effective and 
how the people prepare for terrorism. In near future, 
not only explosives detection system but also 
countermeasures against CBRN terrorism may be 
necessary. Hopefully, the discussion starts soon 
before CBRN terrorist attacks are realized in our 
society.  
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